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Abstract—In this paper, a resilient controller is designed for
the linear time invariant (LTI) systems subject to attacks on the
sensors and the actuators. A novel probabilistic attack model
is proposed to capture vulnerabilities of the communication
links from sensors to the controller and from the controller to
actuators. The observer and the controller formulation under the
attack is derived. Thereafter, By leveraging Lyapunov functional
methods, it is shown that exponential mean square stability of
the system under the output feedback controller is guaranteed
if a certain LMI is feasible. The simulation results show the
effectiveness and applicability of the proposed controller design
approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of digital network technology, the net-
worked control systems (NCSs) have found successful ap-
plication in industrial processes [1], power grids [2] and so
forth because of their important advantages such as low cost,
improved utilizing of resources, and simplicity of maintenance.
But the vulnerability of communication links to the cyber
attacks in NCS has increased. Some factors such as the
adoption of open communication standards and protocols,
novel energy storage technologies [3], [4] and connection to
the internet help the attackers to launch a successful attack on
different NCSs. To deal with security concerns in the modern
control systems, it is essential to make the control systems
resilient to the malicious attackers.
The topic of the resiliency of control systems to different
types of cyber attacks is considered in several research on de-
signing cyber-resilient systems [5]–[7]. In summary, a resilient
control system is determined by its level of resiliency of the
system under attacks condition [8]. For instance, the false data
injection attacks and the data alteration attacks are examples
of the unexpected threats which are used to deteriorate the
normal operation of control systems [9]–[11]. Also, different
approaches such as hybrid analysis [12] and machine learning
methods [13] are utilized for the resilient detection and control
in various control systems.
In recent years, many studies have discussed the definition,
mathematical frameworks, and the application of resilient
cyber systems in the modern NCS. [14] has proposed a game
theoretic approach to solve the cascade failure problem in
industrial control systems. Thereafter, the interdependency
between cyber security and robust control design has been
investigated, and some optimal criteria for the linear quadratic
case have been obtained. In [15], A cyber-resilient controller
is proposed for a class of nonlinear discrete systems under
actuator attacks where the interaction of the attacker and the
IDS is captured with a game in the detection layer. In [16], the
condition for the existence of a robust resilient state feedback
controller for a certain class of nonlinear discrete systems with
norm bounded nonlinearity, is obtained. [17] proposes a robust
estimator for a class of nonlinear time varying systems with
randomly occurring uncertainties, and the specific H∞ perfor-
mance is obtained for the estimator by leveraging stochastic
stability analysis. In [18], a mathematical formulation for the
examination of the security problems in the control system has
been introduced, and the definition of the several key words
in resilient control system design such as state awareness
and operational normalcy in a mathematical framework is
developed. [19] considers the problem of malicious behavior
of the attackers in the control systems as an unknown input
observer design problem. [20] has focused on effects of the
specific type of attacks in industrial control systems. In [20],
the impacts of the reply attacks on the performance of the
control systems in the steady state conditions are analyzed.
[20] shows that the attack is undetectable due to recording the
sensors’ data and propagating the sensors’ data during false
data injection attacks on the actuators of the system. [21] and
[22] analyze the problem of the secure estimation and the
secure control of a system when the sensors and the actuators
are under attacks. [22] shows that it is impossible to recover
the states of a system if more than half of the sensors are
under the attacks.
In this paper, a probabilistic attack model is proposed
to examine attacks on the sensors and the actuators of the
LTI systems. The unreliability of the communication links
between sensors to controller and controller to actuators have
been modeled by Bernoulli random variables.The fraction
of the time that each sensor/actuator is under the attack is
modeled by a Bernouli variable. Then, the observer and the
controller equations are derived based on expected value of
the random variable. Thereafter, the controller is designed
based on feasibility of a certain LMI condition obtained by
leveraging the stochastic Lyapunov function approach.
This paper is organized as follows: In section II, the math-
ematical model of attacks and the closed-loop dynamics of
the system under attacks are introduced. The controller design
procedure and the stochastic stability analysis are examined in
section III. The efficiency of the proposed resilient controller
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is shown by an example in section IV and conclusions are
made at the end.
———————————————————————
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Consider the following discrete time-invariant system:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) (1)
y(k) = Cx(k) (2)
where x(k) ∈ Rn is the system state, u(k) ∈ Rm is the input
control signal, y(k) ∈ Rp is the measured output, A, B and C
are the constant matrices with appropriate dimensions. Shown
in figure 1, it is assumed the communication links between
sensors to controller and controller to the actuators are not
secure and the attackers is able to manipulate the sensor and
actuator values.
The proposed attack model for the sensor measurements
based on stochastic control theory is given as:
y˜(k) = Π1Cx(k) + (I −Π1)Π2Cx(k) (3)
Where y˜(k) ∈ Rp is the measured output under attack,
Π1 = diag{α1, α2, . . . , αp} with αi(i = 1, 2, . . . , p) are
p uncorrolated stochastic variables coming from a Bernoulli
distribution, and Π2 = diag{β1, β2, . . . , βp} with βi(i =
1, 2, . . . , p) are p uncorrelated stochastic variables coming
from an unknown probability distribution. The mathematical
expectation and variance of the random variables αi and βi
are defined as following:
E{αi} = Prob(αi = 1) = α¯i (4)
V ar{αi} = α21i (5)
E{βi} = β¯i (6)
V ar{βi} = β21i (7)
where E(x) and V ar(x) denote the mathematical expectation
and variance of random variable x respectively. β¯i is the
expected value of attack injected on the ith sensor, and β1i
models the deviation from the optimal strategy.
Remark 1. The random variable αi taking value on {0, 1}
has been introduced to represent the attack on the ith sensor.
When αi is equal zero, the correct value of the ith sensor
is substituted by the injected attack value. The mathematical
expectation of Bernoulli random variable αi determines the
fraction of time that the ith sensor is under attack.
Given (1) and (3), the observer dynamics and the controller
attack model are:
xˆ(k + 1) = Axˆ(k + 1) +Bu(k)− L[y˜ − Π¯1Cxˆ(k)
− (I − Π¯1)Π¯2C1xˆ(k)] (8)
u(k) = Π3Kxˆ(k) + (I −Π3)Π4Kxˆ(k) (9)
where xˆ(k) ∈ Rn denotes the system state estimation
vector, L ∈ Rn×p and K ∈ Rm×n are observer gain and
controller gain, Π3 = diag{γ1, γ2, . . . , γm} with γi(i =
1, 2, . . . ,m) are m uncorrolated stochastic variables coming
Figure 1. The schematic of the control system with unreliable communication
links.
from a Bernoulli distribution, and Π4 = diag{δ1, δ2, . . . , δm}
with δi(i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) are m uncorrelated stochastic vari-
ables coming from an unknown probability distribution. The
mathematical expectation and variance of the random variables
γi and δi are defined as follows:
E{γi} = Prob(γi = 1) = γ¯i (10)
V ar{γi} = γ21i (11)
E{δi} = δ¯i (12)
V ar{δi} = δ21i. (13)
γ¯i is the expected value of attack injected on the ith actuator,
and γ1i models the deviation from the optimal strategy. Since
Π1, Π2, Π3, and Π4 are diagonal matrices with random
independent elements, the following equations can be used to
obtain expected value and variance of ΠiΠj(i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4):
E(XY ) = E(X)E(Y ) (14)
V ar(XY ) = [E(X)]2V ar(Y ) + [E(Y )]2V ar(X)
+ V ar(X)V ar(Y ) (15)
where X and Y are two independent random variables.
The estimation error is defined as:
ek = xk − xˆk. (16)
The closed-loop dynamics of the system is obtained By
substituting (3) and (9) into (1) and (16):
x(k + 1) = [A+B(Π¯3 + (I − Π¯3)Π¯4)K]x(k)+
B[(Π3 − Π¯3) + (Π4 − Π¯4)− (Π3Π4 − Π¯3Π¯4)]Kx(k)
−B[Π¯3 + (I − Π¯3)Π¯4]Ke(k)−B[(Π3 − Π¯3) + (Π4 − Π¯4)
− (Π3Π4 − Π¯3Π¯4)]Ke(k)
(17)
e(k + 1) = (A− L(Π¯1 + Π¯2 − Π¯1Π¯2)Ce(k)
− L[(Π1 − Π¯1) + (Π2 − Π¯2)− (Π1Π2 − Π¯1Π¯2)]Cx(k)
(18)
where Π¯1, Π¯2, Π¯3, and Π¯4 are mathematical expectations of
Π1, Π2, Π3, and Π4 respectively. The compact representation
of the closed-loop system is:
ζ(k + 1) = Γ1ζ(k) + Γ2ζ(k) (19)
where
ζ(k) =
[
x(k)
e(k)
]
Γ1 =
[
A+B∆2K −B∆2K
0 A− L∆1C
]
Γ2 =
[
B(∆2 − ∆¯2)K −B(∆2 − ∆¯2)K
−L(∆1 − ∆¯1)C 0
]
∆1 = Π1 + Π2 −Π1Π2
∆2 = Π3 + Π4 −Π3Π4
III. CONTROLLER DESIGN
In this section, the sufficient conditions for the stability of
LTI systems under the attack are derived. To deal with the
stochastic variables defined in the attack models, it is necessary
to use the concept of stochastic stability in the mean square
sense. In the following, the notation of stochastic stability in
the mean square sense is defined.
Definition 1. The solution ζ = 0 for the closed-loop system
given in (19) is said exponentially stable in mean square sense
if there exists constants ρ ∈ [0, 1] and σ > 0 such that
E{‖ζ(k)‖2} ≤ σρkE{‖ζ(0)‖2} (20)
for any ζ(0) and any k ≥ 0.
Following Lemma is the base of deriving the sufficient
conditions for mean square stability of the system given in
(19).
Lemma 1. [24] If there exists real constant τ ∈ [0, 1] such
that
E{V (ζ(k + 1)|ζ(k))} − V (ζ(k)) ≤ −τV (ζ(k)) (21)
and V (k) is a quadratic Lyapunov function, then the sequence
ζ(k) will be exponential mean square stable.
Theorem 1. The system given in (19) is exponential mean
square stable, if there exists matrices Q1 > 0, Q2 > 0, G,
and H with appropriate dimensions such that satisfying the
following LMI: −Q ∗ ∗Σ1 −Q ∗
Σ2 0 −Q
 < 0 (22)
where
Q =
[
Q1 0
0 Q2
]
Σ1 =
[
Q1A+B∆2G −B∆2G
0 Q2A−H∆1C
]
Σ2 =
[
B∆22G B∆22G
−H∆11C 0
]
∆11 = (V ar{∆1})1/2
∆22 = (V ar{∆2})1/2
proof : Consider the following Lyapunov fuction:
V (k) = xT (k)Q1x(k) + e
T (k)Q2e(k) (23)
where Q1 and Q2 are the solution of (22). Utilizing the results
of lemma 1, we obtain:
E{V ((k + 1)|V (k))} − V (k) =
E{xT (k + 1)Q1x(k + 1) + eT (k + 1)Q2e(k + 1)|
x(k), . . . , x(0), e(k), . . . , e(0)} − xT (k)Q1x(k)−
eT (k)Q2e(k) = E{[(A+B∆2K)x(k)−B∆2Ke(k)
+B(∆2 − ∆¯2)Kx(k)−B(∆2 − ∆¯2)Ke(k)]T
Q1[(A+B∆2K)x(k)−B∆2Ke(k)
+B(∆2 − ∆¯2)Kx(k)−B(∆2 − ∆¯2)Ke(k)]}
+ E{[(A− L∆1C)e(k)− L(∆1 − ∆¯1)Cx(k)]T
Q2[(A− L∆1C)e(k)− L(∆1 − ∆¯1)Cx(k)]}
− xT (k)Q1x(k)− eT (k)Q2e(k)
(24)
By taking mathematical expectation from (24), we have:
E{V ((k + 1)|V (k))} − V (k)
= [(A+B∆¯2K)x(k)−B∆¯2Ke(k)]TQ1
[(A+B∆¯2K)x(k)−B∆¯2Ke(k)]+
[(A− L∆1C)e(k)]TQ2[(A− L∆1C)e(k)]+
[B∆22Kx(k) +B∆22Ke(k)]
TQ1[B∆22Kx(k)+
B∆22Ke(k)] + [L∆11Cx(k)]
TQ2[L∆11Cx(k)]
− xT (k)Q1x(k)− eT (k)Q2e(k) = ζTΩζ
(25)
where,
Ω =
[
Ω1
Ω2
]T [
Q1 0
0 Q2
] [
Ω1
Ω2
]
+
[
B∆22K B∆22K
L∆11C 0
]T [
Q1 0
0 Q2
]
×
[
B∆22K B∆22K
L∆11C 0
]
−
[
Q1 0
0 Q2
]
(26)
Ω1 =
[
A+B∆¯2K −B∆¯2K
]
Ω2 =
[
0 A− L∆¯1C
]
∆11 = [V ar{∆1}]1/2,∆22 = [V ar{∆2}]1/2
(27)
If matrix Ω is negative definite, it is concluded that the
closed-loop system given in (19) is exponentially stable in
mean square sense based on the lemma (1). Utilizing the Schur
complement, the matrix Ω in (26) is negative definite if (28)
is satisfied. thereafter, It is not hard to show that LMI (29)
implies (28). The proof of the theorem (1) is completed by
leveraging lemma (2).
Lemma 2. [25] For the full rank matrix B ∈ Rm×n in the
singular value decomposition form, there exist a nonsingular
matrix W such that BW = Q1B, if and only if there exists a
symmetric matrix Q1 in the following form:
Q1 = U
[
Q11 0
0 Q22
]
UT (30)
B = U
[
B0
0
]
V T (31)
where Q11 ∈ Rm×m > 0, Q22 ∈ R(n−m)×(n−m) > 0, U ∈
Rm×m and V ∈ Rn×n are unitary matrices, B0 ∈ Rm×m is
a diagonal matrix with positive diagonal elements.
It follows from Lemma (2) that we can substitute BW
with Q1B in LMI (28). Thereafter, we can easily see that
the proof of theorem (1) is complete, if G and H are defined
as following in (29)
G = WK (32)
H = Q2L. (33)
Solution to the LMI given in theorem (1) is utilized to obtain
controller gain (K) and observer gain (L) for mean square
stability of the system defined in (19). Assume Q1, Q2, G,
and H are the solution of (22), and Q1 is in the form of (30).
The matrix W in lemma (2) is computed as:
U
[
B0
0
]
V TW = U
[
Q11 0
0 Q22
]
UTU
[
B0
0
]
V T (34)
which implies:[
B0
0
]
V TW =
[
Q11 0
0 Q22
] [
B0
0
]
V T (35)
W = (B0V
T )−1Q11B0V T . (36)
It is concluded from (32), (33), and (36) that
K = W−1G (37)
L = Q−12 H (38)
The K and L calculated by (37) and (38) guarantee the
exponential mean square stability of the LTI system (1) when
the sensors and actuators are under the attacks.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the following third order LTI system under
attacks is considered.
x(k + 1) =
−1.7 −0.5 0.11 0 −0.7
0 0.8 0
x(k) +
1 00 1
0 0
u(k)
y(k) =
[
α1 0
0 α2
] [
1 0 1
0 1 0
]
x(k) + (
[
1 0
0 1
]
−
[
α1 0
0 α2
]
)
×
[
β1 0
0 β2
] [
1 0 1
0 1 0
]
x(k)
(39)
Given (39), the observer dynamics and the controller attack
model are:
xˆ(k + 1) =
−1.7 −0.5 0.11 0 −0.7
0 0.8 0
 xˆ(k) +
1 00 1
0 0
u(k)
− L[y(k)−
[
α¯1 0
0 α¯2
] [
1 0 1
0 1 0
]
xˆ(k)− (
[
1 0
0 1
]
−
[
α¯1 0
0 α¯2
]
)
×
[
β¯1 0
0 β¯2
] [
1 0 1
0 1 0
]
)xˆ(k)
u(k) =
[
γ1 0
0 γ2
]
Kxˆ(k) + (
[
1 0
0 1
]
−
[
γ1 0
0 γ2
]
×
[
δ1 0
0 δ2
]
)Kx(k)
(40)
where
E{α1} = 0.7, E{α2} = 0.8
E{γ1} = 0.8, E{γ2} = 0.9
(41)
The expected values of αi(i = 1, 2) and γi(i = 1, 2) show
the fraction of time that sensors and actuators work normally.
Given (41), the sensors of the system are under attacks for
30 and 20 percent of the time in average respectively, and the
actuators of the system are under attack for 20 and 10 percent
of the time in average respectively.

−Q1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
0 −Q2 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
A+B∆2K −B∆2K −Q−11 ∗ ∗ ∗
0 A− L∆1C 0 −Q−12 ∗ ∗
B∆22K B∆22K 0 0 −Q−11 ∗
L∆11C 0 0 0 0 −Q−12
 < 0 (28)

−Q1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
0 −Q2 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Q1(A+B∆2K) −Q1B∆2K −Q1 ∗ ∗ ∗
0 Q2(A− L∆1C) 0 −Q2 ∗ ∗
Q1B∆22K Q1B∆22K 0 0 −Q1 ∗
Q2L∆11C 0 0 0 0 −Q2
 < 0 (29)
Figure 2. The system states and observer states response under the attacks.
Figure 3. The attack patterns on actuators of the system.
β¯i(i = 1, 2) and δ¯i(i = 1, 2) for the simulation purpose is
considered as follows:
δ¯1 = β¯1 = 1.3, δ¯2 = β¯2 = 1.1
The solution to the LMI (22) provides the feedback gain
and the observer gain for the unstable system defined in (39).
K =
[
1.1475 −0.1962 −1.4460
−0.7689 0.3120 1.3376
]
L =
 0.0674 1.5850−0.0376 −0.8844
0.0217 0.5095
 . (42)
Given the initial conditions x(0) =
[
1 1.2 −0.8]T and
xˆ(0) =
[
0 0 0
]T
, the state responses is shown in figure 2.
Figures 3 and 4 show the attack patterns on actuators and
sensors of the system where αi = 0 and γ1 = 0 denote the
system is under the attack. The actuator signals and the sensor
measurements under the attacks are shown in figures 5 and 6
respectively.
Figure 4. The attack patterns on sensors of the system.
Figure 5. The control signals of the actuators under attacks.
Figure 6. The sensor measurement signals under attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel probabilistic model for the attack on
sensors and actuators of LTI systems has been introduced.
Denial-of-Service (Dos) attack is considered as a subclass
of the introduced stochastic attack models. The probabilis-
tic attacks on sensors and actuators are allowed to happen
simultaneously in the system and the mean square stability
of the system under attacks on sensors and the actuators is
proved by leveraging stochastic control theory. The sufficient
conditions for the existence of resilient controller gain and the
observer gain are obtained, and it is shown that the problem of
designing an output feedback controller is solvable if a certain
LMI condition is satisfied.
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